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Abstract. Under which conditions and to what extent do governments pursue unpopular
social policy reforms for which they might be punished in the next election? This article
shows that there exists substantial cross-cabinet variation in the degree to which govern-
ments take unpopular measures and argues that current studies cannot adequately explain
this variation. Using insights from prospect theory, a psychological theory of choice under
risk, this study hypothesises that governments only engage in unpopular reform if they face
a deteriorating socio-economic situation, a falling political position, or both. If not, they shy
away from the risk of reform. A fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) of
the social policy reform activities pursued by German, Dutch, Danish and British cabinets
between 1979 and 2005 identifies a deteriorating socio-economic situation as necessary for
unpopular reform. It is only sufficient for triggering reform, however, if the political position
is also deteriorating and/or the cabinet is of rightist composition.This study’s findings further
the scholarly debate on the politics of welfare state reform by offering a micro-foundation
that helps one to understand what induces political actors aspiring to be re-elected to engage
in electorally risky unpopular reform.
Introduction
One of the findings that continues to emerge in the body of work focusing on
welfare state reform (broadly defined as ranging from radical changes over-
hauling the welfare state system to (minor) cutbacks in unemployment ben-
efits) is that reform is politically risky and difficult. The core programmes of
the welfare state receive wide electoral support, which makes curbing them
unpopular and politically dangerous (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1996; Becker
2005; Boeri et al. 2001; Brooks & Manza 2006; see also Kitschelt 2001). More-
over the costs of, for example, cutbacks are usually concentrated, while the
benefits are dispersed (Pierson 1994). The difficulty of reform arises from this
political deadlock as well as from institutional hindrances to reform such as
veto points and the process of path dependency (e.g., Pierson 2001; Swank
2002).
In spite of these political and institutional hurdles, unpopular reform has
taken place. Given the theoretical unexpectedness of such reforms, it comes as
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no surprise that many studies try to explain the occurrence of reform (for
reviews and overviews, see Green-Pedersen & Haverland 2002; Huber &
Stephens 2001;Myles &Quadagno 2002; Scharpf & Schmidt 2000; Starke 2006;
Van Kersbergen 2002). Stressing the importance of, among other factors, socio-
economic problems and problem load, partisanship, institutions and ideas, this
body of literature has come a long way in explaining the variation in reform
pursued across countries, welfare programmes and/or over time. However,
existing theories fall short when it comes to explaining the variation across
governments in the adoption of electorally risky measures. Why are some
governments willing to engage in unpopular reform, whereas other govern-
ments shy away from this risk?1 Why, for example, did the Dutch Christian
democratic/conservative liberals (CDA/VVD) cabinet pursue many unpopu-
lar measures in its first term in office, while refraining from them in its second
term (Green-Pedersen 2002: Chapter 5)? And why did the German coalition
of social democrats and Greens (SPD/die Grünen) eschew unpopular reforms
in its first period in office, but implement a radical reform agenda in its second
term (Kemmerling & Bruttel 2006; Leibfried & Obinger 2003)? Understand-
ing the variation in reform across governments advances the scholarly discus-
sion on the politics of welfare state reform by clarifying why political actors
seeking to be re-elected engage in risky unpopular reform.
In this article, I address the issue of cross-cabinet variation by examining
under which conditions and to what extent governments pursue unpopular,
and hence risky, reform.2 I argue that current theories need to be comple-
mented with insights from prospect theory – a context-sensitive, behavioural
theory of choice under risk (Kahneman&Tversky 1979) – to yield a systematic
account. The key empirical finding of prospect theory is that individuals are
cautious in their decision making (i.e., risk averse) when facing favourable
prospects (i.e., gains), but tend towards bold decision making (i.e., risk seeking
or risk accepting) when confronting threats to their well-being (i.e., losses) (for
recent reviews of prospect theory in political science, see Levy 2003; McDer-
mott 2004; Mercer 2005).3 This finding provides important insights into under-
standing why and to what extent governments engage in unpopular social
policy measures. Specifically, I contend that the extent to which a government
undertakes unpopular reform in a given period in office is conditional on the
‘losses’ it faces. If a government confronts a comfortable socio-economic situ-
ation (e.g., a flourishing economy, low levels of unemployment) and/or a solid
political position (e.g., a large parliamentary majority), it displays risk averse
behaviour and shies away from the risk of pursuing unpopular measures.
Conversely, if a government faces a deteriorating socio-economic situation
(e.g., a plummeting growth rate, rising levels of unemployment) and/or a
weakening political position (e.g., a fall in the polls), it demonstrates risk
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accepting behaviour and accepts the dangers of pursuing unpopular reform.
Consequently, the presence of ‘losses’ is necessary for governments to engage
in risky reform (cf. Vis & Van Kersbergen 2007).
Necessity as well as sufficiency can be conceptualised as set-theoretical
relationships, which makes fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/
QCA)4 particularly apt for testing the argument outlined above (Ragin 1987,
2000; Schneider &Wagemann 2006; for recent applications of fuzzy-set theory
and QCA in this journal, see, e.g., Grendstad 2007; Pennings 2003; Rihoux
2006; Veugelers & Magnan 2005). The empirical analysis focuses on 25
German, Dutch, Danish and British cabinets between 1979 and 2005.5 Hence,
the research design combines intra-national and cross-national comparisons.
The advantage of this design is twofold. First, the intra-national comparisons
between different cabinets within a country (e.g., Lubbers I, II, III, Kok I and
Kok II in the Netherlands) control for the influence of institutional variables
such as the party system. Second, the cross-national comparisons between the
cabinets of different countries reveal the robustness of the findings as the four
countries constitute different ‘types’ of welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990,
1999) with different types of party competition (e.g., Kitschelt 2001). Finally,
the design controls for the impact of partisanship as all countries (apart from
the UK) had rightist cabinets as well as leftist ones that pursued unpopular
reforms in one cabinet period and abstained from them in another.
The empirical analysis highlights three findings. First, the extent to which
governments engage in unpopular social policy reform varies greatly across
(similar) cabinets, which makes examining this variation worthwhile. Second,
in line with the prospect-theoretical hypothesis, a deteriorating socio-
economic situation is the necessary condition for unpopular reform; without
this contextual factor, governments abstain from risky reforms.6 Third, a weak-
ening socio-economic situation is only sufficient for unpopular reform in com-
bination with at least one of two other factors: a weakening political position
or a rightist government. That is to say, a dwindling socio-economic situation
combined with a deteriorating political position and/or a rightist government
induces governments to accept the possible electoral penalties of reform and
introduce controversial measures. If these combined conditions are absent,
governments shy away from adopting risky reform.
The structure of the article is as follows.The next section demonstrates that
existing theories fail to account for the variation in governments’ risk tenden-
cies.The third section introduces prospect theory as a way to fill the lacunae in
previous work on social policy reform and develops the prospect-theoretical
hypotheses. The next section discusses the measurement of the outcome (i.e.,
dependent variable) and documents the extent to which the various govern-
ments pursued unpopular reforms. The fifth section tests the hypotheses by
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means of a fs/QCA analysis.The final section discusses the study’s findings and
implications.
Insufficiency of current theories of welfare reform
Existing theories fail to account adequately for the cross-cabinet variation in
unpopular reform. Studies focusing on the formal political institutions or the
institutions of the welfare state highlight the opportunities or limits these
institutions exert on social policy reform (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1996; Pierson
1996, 2001; Scharpf & Schmidt 2000; Swank 2002).Whereas this body of work
helps one to understand variation across countries, it has great difficulty
accounting for the cross-cabinet variation in the degree of reform as govern-
ments in the same country face the same institutional constraints and oppor-
tunities (Armingeon et al. 2005).
Approaches emphasising politics posit that partisanship matters. Specifi-
cally, rightist governments are associated with harsher cutbacks in the welfare
state than leftist ones (e.g., Allan & Scruggs 2004; Korpi & Palme 2003). Or,
conversely, leftist governments are considered better at enacting painful mea-
sures as the public trusts these parties to conduct reform carefully and only
when really necessary (e.g., Ross 2000). Furthermore, studies in this strand of
research suggest that differences in the system of party competition or party
consensus affect the opportunities governments have for pursuing unpopular
reform (Green-Pedersen 2002;Kitschelt 2001).Notwithstanding the important
insights regarding the mechanisms of reform these studies generate, the
explanatory strength of the partisanship argument falls short when explaining
reform within a single country as both rightist and leftist cabinets in Germany,
the Netherlands and Denmark, for example, pursued unpopular reforms.
Moreover, if leftist governments will take up unpopular measures according to
a Nixon-goes-to-China logic (cf. Ross 2000), why did Schröder wait until his
second term in office?
Studies adopting a (neo)functionalist approach argue that socio-economic
changes, such as population ageing and the process of globalisation, and the
associated problem load trigger reform (see, e.g., Castles 2004; Huber &
Stephens 2001; Schwartz 2001). Theoretically, linking socio-economic changes
and problem load to reform makes sense. If, for example, the unemployment
level is skyrocketing, measures from the government are likely. The problem
with the socio-economic account is that it is still a moot point as to ‘how exactly
socio-economic variables matter for the timing and extent of cutbacks’ (Starke
2006: 107). If socio-economic difficulty sparks change, we should have seen
cutbacks under Kohl I–III as these cabinets operated under high levels of
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unemployment (average 6.3 per cent; Armingeon et al. 2005). The Dutch case
is also problematic in this respect, as under Lubbers II the country faced
substantial socio-economic problems but unpopular measures were absent.
Approaches highlighting the importance of ideas suggest that by invoking
a specific discourse or imperative, political actors may overcome the hin-
drances to change and successfully implement reform (e.g., Cox 2001; Kuipers
2006; Schmidt 2002; Stiller 2007; see also Campbell 2002). Next to the role of
ideas, these studies also pay attention to the degree to which political actors
can learn (e.g., Hemerijck & Schludi 2000). The main problem within this
strand of literature is that the causal mechanisms with which different types
of ideas affect policy making are often poorly specified (Campbell 2002: 29).
Consequently, there is little theoretical footing as regards when ideas actually
are taken up.Given the difficultly of reform,why and how do ‘change-oriented
actors’ (Kuipers 2006) become change-oriented? How does one explain what
political actors actually do? It is exactly such a theoretical foothold that is
necessary for explaining the cross-cabinet variation in unpopular reform. I
argue that insights from prospect theory complement existing theories, yield-
ing a systematic account of unpopular reform (and the absence thereof).
Insights from prospect theory
Prospect theory is developed as a behavioural alternative to expected utility
theory as the latter failed repeatedly to predict how people actually make
choices (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, 2000). Controlled experiments disclosed
that these violations were systematic (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1981), and
resulted in the prospect theory’s central empirical finding: people lean towards
caution (risk averseness) when they face favourable prospects, but tend
towards risk accepting behaviour when they confront threats to their well-
being. Instead of basing decisions on end-states (as expected utility theory
posits), according to prospect theory people make decisions based on relative
gains and losses they determine using a reference point. The choices made in a
so-called ‘gains domain’ differ radically from those made in a ‘losses domain’
because individuals’ willingness to take risk varies across domains.
The risk accepting behaviour in the domain of losses stems from people’s
relative aversion to loss (Brooks & Zank 2005; Tversky & Kahneman 1991).
Loss aversion has to do with the facts that ‘losses loom larger than gains’
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979: 279) and that ‘losses hurt more than equal gains
please’ (McDermott 2004: 298). Individuals adapt more rapidly to positive
changes in their situation (such as a pay rise) than to negative ones (such as a
pay cut), and losing twenty euros hurts more than finding twenty euros pleases.
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This loss aversion is the primary underlying factor for the so-called ‘status quo
bias’, suggesting that ‘individuals have a strong tendency to remain at the
status quo because the disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than advan-
tages’ (Kahneman et al. 1991: 197–198).The inclination to remain at the status
quo is so strong that it is very difficult for individuals not to display this bias
(Samuelson & Zeckhauser 1988).
There are a number of problems with applications of prospect theory, one
of which should be dealt with here: how to determine the reference point?This
point is crucially important as the actor’s domain, which establishes the actor’s
risk attitude, hinges on it. In this respect, prospect theory ‘is a reference-
dependent theory without a theory of the reference point’ (Levy 1997: 100),
which resembles rational choice theory that is, so to speak, a preference-
dependent theory without a theory of preferences (cf. Vis & Van Kersbergen
2007: 158).There are various ways to determine the reference point, including
the status quo, aspiration levels, heuristics, analogies and emotion (see Mercer
2005: 3–11; Tversky & Kahneman 1981: 456).
Generally, individuals are likely to take the status quo as their reference
point (see Boettcher 2004). If an actor is satisfied with the status quo, he or she
is in a gains domain. To the contrary, if an actor is unsatisfied with the status
quo, he or she is in a losses domain. Because there is no general theory of
satisfaction (Mercer 2005: 4), ‘analysts must study the details of a decision
maker’s situation, goals and motivation’ in order to assess the acceptability of
this point. In many cases, it is quite easy to establish the status quo’s accept-
ability. A deteriorating political position, for example, likely puts actors in a
domain of losses.Also domestic politics, institutional structures and situational
factors such as economic crises can be used to determine the status quo’s
acceptability (e.g., Weyland 2002).
Taking the status quo as reference point makes sense in the case of the
welfare state (cf. Vis &Van Kersbergen 2007). First, welfare state reform is all
about changing a situation that is characterised by institutional resilience and
electoral resistance against change. Second, both the reformers and those
affected by the reforms are influenced by the status quo bias and thus have a
strong tendency to remain at the status quo. How, then, to determine whether
the status quo is acceptable? Here, I follow Mercer (2005) and focus on the
situation a government is in. Building on the (neo)functionalist account, the
first causal condition is the country’s socio-economic situation. Unlike studies
identifying problem load as such as inducing governments to engage in
unpopular reform, prospect theory indicates that a worsening socio-economic
performance (e.g., increasing levels of unemployment, deteriorating growth
rates) puts a government in a domain of losses – because it knows it might
be punished for the perilous socio-economic state in the next election
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(Lewis-Beck & Paldam 2000) – and thereby triggers reform. Conversely, pros-
pect theory suggests that governments probably view an improving socio-
economic state (e.g., rising levels of employment, a booming economy) as a
gain, tempering substantially their willingness to reform.
Another factor that likely influences the degree of reform is governments’
political position. Usually, the argument is that the better this position (e.g.,
the larger the majority in parliament), the better the prospects for enacting
changes (see, e.g., Keeler 1993). However, the key finding of prospect theory
suggests that it is a weakening – instead of an excellent or improving – political
position (e.g., a meagre electoral victory, a minority in the upper house in a
bicameral system such as Germany) that puts governments in a domain of
losses, prompting reform.An improving political position of the main opposi-
tion party (e.g., electoral victory, domination of the upper house) also may put
governments in a losses domain. Conversely, prospect theory’s central result
suggests that governments probably view their own burgeoning political posi-
tion (e.g., landslide electoral victory, domination of both chambers in a bicam-
eral system) as a gain, impeding reform.
Finally, because the prospect-theoretical finding of varying risk propensi-
ties across domains should hold for all political actors, the political colour of
the cabinet should not influence the extent to which governments pursue
unpopular reform.
To sum up, three hypotheses guide the empirical analysis:
H1: Governments pursue unpopular social policy reform only
if the socio-economic situation and/or the cabinet’s political position is
deteriorating.
H2: Governments shy away from pursuing unpopular measures if
the socio-economic situation and/or the cabinet’s political position is
improving.
H3: The political colour of cabinets does not affect the governments’
pursuit of unpopular welfare state reform.
These hypotheses are empirically tested by means of fs/QCA. Before turning
to this analysis, the next section establishes the extent to which the 25 govern-
ments under study engage in unpopular reform.
The pattern of unpopular reform
How to establish the degree to which cabinets pursue electorally risky mea-
sures or abstain from doing so? This question is important as the comparative
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literature on the welfare state suffers from a so-called ‘dependent variable
problem’ (Green-Pedersen 2004) concerning how to define social policy
reform (i.e., its theoretical conceptualisation) and how to measure it (i.e., its
empirical operationalisation) (see Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi & Palme
2003; Kühner 2007). Different authors employ different definitions, which
leads to different operationalisations and, consequently, different findings.
Results that contradict one another are not a problem per se.However, lack
of clarity as regards the definition(s) and operationalisation(s) employed is.
The latter pertains particularly to qualitative (small-n) studies. Often, scholars
in the qualitative tradition present only a theoretical definition of reform,
not an operational one. The – generally outstanding – work of Paul Pierson is
a case in point in this respect. Pierson (1996: 158) focuses on ‘reforms that
indicate structural shifts in the welfare state’, including among others ‘dramatic
changes in benefit and eligibility rules that signal a qualitative reform of a
particular program’, but when are changes in benefit and eligibility rules
dramatic enough to indicate qualitative reform (cf. Green-Pedersen 2005: 5)?
Lacking or unclear operationalisations makes replication – one of the corner-
stones of empirical research (cf. King et al. 1994: 26–27) – impossible.
Quantitative (large-n) studies – scoring high on the possibility for replica-
tion – face a different problem, which is that they may fail to capture qualita-
tive welfare state changes. For example, this article concentrates on unpopular
social policy reform, which cannot be captured simply by cutbacks in, for
example, social expenditure. Because of the variation across welfare state
regimes in voters’ support for welfare policy (Larsen 2008), a reduction in
social expenditures of, say, 10 per cent is likely more unpopular in the social
democratic countries than in the liberal ones.
Hence, let me elaborate the definition and operationalisation of unpopular
reform adopted here. ‘Reform’ is defined broadly and ranges from radical
changes overhauling the welfare state system to (minor) cutbacks in unem-
ployment benefits. The extent of unpopular reform is a combination of the
extent of reform and its unpopularity.To establish the extent of reform, I draw
on quantitative and qualitative sources, which Table A1 (in the Appendix)
summarises. Fuzzy-sets are particularly apt for incorporating these two types
of sources since they comprise both qualitative and quantitative states. A
‘fuzzy-set’ should be seen as ‘a fine-grained, [pseudo] continuous measure that
has been carefully calibrated using substantive and theoretical knowledge
relevant to set membership’ (Ragin 2000: 7).An important feature of fuzzy-set
theory is that cases’ membership in different sets (i.e., variables) can vary.
Thus, instead of government’s reform activities being either unpopular or
not unpopular, anything between these two poles is possible. The qualitative
feature of a fuzzy-set lies in the two qualitative breakpoints, 1 and 0, that are
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selected by the researcher and correspond to these poles. Specifically, the
breakpoints signify, respectively, the situations that all of the government’s
reform activities are unpopular and that none is (in fuzzy-set terminology:
‘fully in’ and ‘fully out’ of the set Unpopular Reform). The degree of mem-
bership between 0 and 1, then, provides the quantitative aspect. To assign the
fuzzy-set membership scores of (here) unpopular reform, the researcher uses
both substantive and theoretical knowledge (Ragin 2000: 155–159, 2006:
22–26). Scores above 0.5 indicate that a government engages in unpopular
reform (i.e., ‘in’ the set of Unpopular Reform); scores below 0.5 suggest that a
government refrains from unpopular reform (i.e., ‘out’ of the set Unpopular
Reform).
I use two quantitative sources. First, the percentage point change during the
cabinet period in the net unemployment insurance (UI) replacement rate and
the net sick pay replacement rate, both averaged for two groups: a single
average production worker (APW), and a married APW with an unemployed
spouse and two children (Scruggs 2004; see Scruggs &Allan 2006).The second
quantitative source of information is the percentage change during the cabinet
period in the generosity index. This index is a revised version of Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) decommodification index that taps into the degree to which
citizens are independent from the market for their livelihood (Scruggs 2004;
see Scruggs &Allan 2006).With respect to the qualitative material employed,
the most important sources of information are the Social Security Worldwide
dataset of the International Social SecurityAssociation (ISSA 2006), the infor-
mation on reforms available in the International Reform Monitors of the
Bertelsmann Foundation (various years) and case studies of the countries
under review.
To establish the unpopularity of reform, I use mainly the qualitative
sources listed above. Still, it is plausible to assume that cutbacks in benefit
levels are usually unpopular as voters often react negatively to them. The
context (e.g., the country, type of welfare state regime) affects how negative
the voters’ response will be. Therefore, I take into account the cross-regime
variation in the support for welfare policy, with support being highest in
Denmark and the Netherlands, intermediate in Germany, and lowest in the
United Kingdom (Larsen 2008). Note that whereas the quantitative material
used is the same across the cases, the qualitative material employed varies –
especially across the four countries. Therefore, the quantitative material pro-
vides the primary source of information, while the qualitative sources are
used as secondary material. A document containing the reasoning behind the
fuzzy-set scores of the outcome Unpopular Reform for all cases is available
upon request from the author. The scores themselves can be found in
Table 3.
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Two examples illustrate how I construct the fuzzy-set scores for Unpopu-
lar Reform. The first Kohl cabinet receives a fuzzy-set score of 0.33, suggest-
ing that Kohl I hardly engaged in unpopular reform. In fuzzy-set
terminology, Kohl I is ‘fairly out’ of the set Unpopular Reform. Although
Kohl I curbed the unemployment replacement rates by 7 per cent, the
changes enacted left the generosity index unaltered (Scruggs 2004). More-
over, despite the promises Kohl made upon taking office, no consistent
pattern of reform materialised (Leibfried & Obinger 2003: 209; Schmidt
2005: 101). Some benefit cuts occurred and eligibility criteria for several
programmes were tightened (Leibfried & Obinger 2003: 209; Schmidt 2005:
99–100). However, these measures were not unpopular per se. Public opinion
surveys demonstrate that the public accepted limited cuts in welfare state
benefits in 1982. From the mid-1980s onwards, Kohl I started to combine
retrenchment initiatives with selective expansion (Aust et al. 2002: 8–9,
28–29; Leibfried & Obinger 2003; Schmidt 2005: 100–101, 105–106). This
trend nicely followed public opinion as surveys show that further cuts would
have received the disproval of voters from 1984 onwards (Alber, referenced
in Zohlnhöfer 2003: 136).
The first Lubbers cabinet receives a score of 0.83, indicating that Lubbers I
pursued many unpopular measures. In fuzzy-set terminology, Lubbers I is
‘almost in’ the set Unpopular Reform. Lubbers I substantially lowered the
unemployment replacement rates by 11 per cent and the changes it enacted
reduced the generosity index by 1 per cent (Scruggs 2004). Furthermore, the
government enacted a harsh retrenchment package, including among others
things indexation of pensions, unemployment benefits and disability pensions,
limitation of the duration of unemployment benefits, and cutbacks in disability
pensions and unemployment benefits (Green-Pedersen 2002: Chapter 5).
Figure 1 displays the pattern of fuzzy-set membership of Unpopular
Reform by country, which shows that the number of cabinets pursuing
unpopular reform (i.e., receiving a score higher than 0.5) is somewhat larger
than the number of cabinets refraining from doing so: 13 versus 12. The
fuzzy-set scores for Unpopular Reform can be found in Table A2.Figure 1 also
indicates that the pursuit of unpopular reforms is not limited to a certain
period: such reforms were taken in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s alike.Moreover,
there is a puzzling variation in the pursuit of unpopular measures by similar
governments in different cabinet periods. Lubbers I & III, Schröder II, Nyrup
Rasmussen II & IV,Kok I,Kohl IV and Schlüter II proved willing to accept the
great risk of reform and enacted unpopular measures, whereas Lubbers II,
Schröder I, Nyrup Rasmussen I, Kok II, Kohl I–III and Schlüter I, IV & V
acted cautiously and refrained from pursuing unpopular policies. Finally, the
British pattern of reform is distinct because it lacks such similar-government
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Figure 1. The pattern of unpopular reform.
Source: Based on the fuzzy-set scores for Unpopular Reform in Table A2.
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variation. Instead, the successive Conservative governments engaged in
unpopular reforms, whereas the Labour governments refrained from doing so.
When do governments engage in unpopular reform?
How does one explain the variation in unpopular reform across governments?
Under which conditions do governments engage in unpopular social policy
reform and when do they refrain from doing so? Drawing on prospect theory,
I hypothesised that governments pursue unpopular reform only if the socio-
economic situation and/or the cabinet’s political position is deteriorating; that
they shy away from reform if the socio-economic situation and/or the cabinet’s
political position is improving; and that the political colour of the cabinet has
no effect on governments’ pursuit of unpopular reform.The causal conditions
in these hypotheses are the socio-economic situation, the government’s politi-
cal position and the colour of the cabinet.
As for the outcome Unpopular Reform, I construct fuzzy-sets for these
conditions, labelled Weak Socio-Economic Situation (WSE), Weak Political
Position (WPP) and rightist government (RIGHT).Note that because fs/QCA
also reveals the absence of a cause, the analysis also considers the influence of
a blossoming socio-economic situation, a solid political position and the pres-
ence of leftist governments. Information on how I assigned the fuzzy-set
membership scores for the three causal conditions (WSE,WPP and RIGHT)
is provided in Tables 1a and 1b. The scores themselves are presented in
Table A2.7,8
The fs/QCA procedure employed here involves two stages, which can be
carried out with the fs/QCA 2.0 software (http://www.compasss.org). In the
first stage, the so-called ‘truth table algorithm’ (Ragin 2005) is used to trans-
form the fuzzy-set membership scores into a truth table (see also Ragin 2006:
96–110).This algorithm uses the direct link between the rows of the truth table
and the corners of the property space, whereby the latter is the multidimen-
sional space consisting of the logically possible combinations of causal condi-
tions (Barton 1955). If there are k conditions, the property space has 2k corners.
In this article, the property space has 23 (= 8) corners. In the second stage, the
researcher examines the distribution of cases across the corners of the prop-
erty space and establishes the degree to which membership in a corner is a
subset of the outcome – that is, to what extent a case’s placement in a specific
combination of conditions (e.g., WSE, WPP, RIGHT) is sufficient for the
outcome (here: Unpopular Reform) (see Ragin 2006: 96).
Table 2 displays the truth table based on the fuzzy-set scores for Unpopular
Reform, WSE, WPP and RIGHT. This table also includes the level of
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Table 1a. Data used to establish the fuzzy-sets WSE and WPP
W The level and change in economic growth
S The level and change in unemployment
E The extent to which the specific socio-economic situation is perceived
as detrimental
The percentage of votes for the governing party/ies
The percentage of votes for the (main) opposition party/ies
W The perception of the public regarding the cabinet
P The effect of political crises on the cabinet’s political position (for the Dutch
cases)
Election results in the Land elections (for the German cases)
Intra-party problems (for the German and British cases)
Vote distribution between the bourgeois and the social democratic block (for
the Danish cases)
Sources: The level and change in economic growth and unemployment: Armingeon et al.
(2005);OECD Economic Outlook (various years);OECD (2005:AnnexTables 1 & 13), own
calculations. For establishing whether a specific socio-economic context is perceived as
detrimental: ‘Notes on Recent Elections’ in Electoral Studies and the annual Political Data
Yearbook of the European Journal of Political Research.The latter sources are also the main
ones for establishing the government’s political position. The percentage of votes of gov-
erning party/ies and opposition party/ies: Armingeon et al. (2005);Woldendorp et al. (2000).
From 2003 onwards, data collected by author from various sources.
Table 1b. Data used to establish the fuzzy-set RIGHT
Fuzzy-set
score Gov_left
1 Hegemony of right-wing parties 0
0.75 Right-wing (and centre) parties dominate 33.3
0.6 Pact between left and right parties, with the rightist party/ies
receiving most of the votes
>33.3; <66.6
0.4 Pact between left and right parties, with the leftist party/ies
receiving most of the votes
>33.3; <66.6
0.25 Dominance of social-democratic and other left parties 66.6
0 Hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties 100
Notes: Gov_left is the cabinet composition, calculated as social-democratic and other left
parties as a percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by days. Measuring the complexion
of a cabinet by means of the share of leftist parties is conventional in the literature (e.g.,
Huber & Stephens 2001; Allan & Scruggs 2004).
Sources: Since 1990, calculations by Armingeon et al. (2005) based on the political data
published in the European Journal of Political Research (Political Data Yearbook, various
issues); Keesing’s Archive; Neue Zürcher Zeitung; People in Power.
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consistency – that is, the degree to which the fuzzy-set membership scores of all
cases in a combination are sufficient for the outcome.The researcher selects a
cut-off point to determine whether a configuration receives a positive (1) or
negative (0) score on the outcome. Gaps in the level of consistency help
identify where to set this cut-off point (Ragin 2005: 14–15). Because the results
in Table 2 suggest a substantial drop in consistency from 0.91 to 0.72, the
cut-off point is set at 0.91. Consequently, I assign a positive outcome to the first
three configurations and a negative one to the next two. Because there are no
Table 2. Truth table
Conditions
WPP WSE RIGHT Outcome UR Consistency N Cabinets
0 1 1 1 0.92 7 Lubbers I & III;
Schlüter II;
Thatcher I
& III; Major I;
[Schlüter IV]
1 1 1 1 0.91 3 Balkenende II;
Kohl IV;
[Schlüter V]
1 1 0 1 0.91 2 Schröder II; Nyrup
Ramussen II (& III)
0 0 1 0 0.72 6 Lubbers II; Kohl I-III;
Schlüter I; [Thatcher
II]
0 0 0 0 0.64 7 Kok II; Schröder I;
Nyrup Rasmussen I;
Blair I & II; [Kok I;
Nyrup Rasmussen
IV]
0 1 0 – 0
1 0 0 – 0
1 0 1 – 0
Notes: WPP = the set Weak Political Position;WSE = the set Weak Socio-Economic Situa-
tion; RIGHT = the set of rightist governments; Outcome UR = the outcome Unpopular
Reform; Consistency indicates the degree to which the fuzzy-set membership scores of all
cases in a combination are sufficient for the outcome;Number = the number of cabinets with
membership in the respective configuration higher than 0.5; Cabinets lists these cabinets,
with those cabinets where a specific configuration of causal conditions produced a deviant
outcome presented between brackets. For example, the cabinet Schlüter V has membership
to the setsWPP andWSE and RIGHT, yet – and different from Balkenende II and Kohl IV
that have membership to the same configuration – unpopular reform is absent.
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empirical cases for the last three configurations, which makes them so-called
‘logical remainders’, these configurations do not receive a score for the
outcome (indicated by ‘–’ in Table 2).
In the second stage, Boolean algebra is employed to minimise the truth
table to identify the (combinations of) causal conditions that are sufficient for
producing the outcome (Ragin 1987: Chapter 6, 2006). The researcher has to
decide what to do with the logical remainders. The most complex solution
results if no ‘simplifying assumptions’ are employed – that is, when the positive
cases are set ‘true’ and all other cases ‘false’. Simplifying assumptions are
statements about the hypothetical outcome of the logical remainders.Themost
parsimonious solution of fs/QCA is attained if the positive cases are set ‘true’,
the negative cases ‘false’ and the remainders ‘don’t care’. In this article, I
employ the most complex solution as this is the most conservative approach
(Schneider &Wagemann 2006), and report the result of the most parsimonious
approach in a footnote.
The fs/QCA analysis finds that the outcome Unpopular Reform is the
product of the conditions [Weak Socio-Economic SituationANDWeak Politi-
cal Position] OR [Weak Socio-Economic Situation AND Rightist Govern-
ment]. In fuzzy-set theory, logical AND (*) refers to the combination of sets.
Accordingly,WSE*WPP denotes ‘in’ the set Weak Socio-Economic Situation
as well as ‘in’ the set Weak Political Position. Logical OR (+) refers to the
intersection of sets. WSE*WPP + WSE*RIGHT thus means that both the
combination of WSE andWPP andWSE and RIGHT can lead to Unpopular
Reform. In fuzzy-set notion, the result of the analysis is
WSE WPP RIGHT UR coverage consistency∗ +( ) → ( ): . ; : . .0 86 0 90 9
This finding indicates that there are two paths towards Unpopular Reform: a
weak socio-economic situation in combination with a weak political position
(WSE*WPP), and a weak socio-economic situation in combination with a
rightist government (WSE*RIGHT). Either of the paths is sufficient, but not
necessary, for producing the outcome. Furthermore, the fs/QCA result indi-
cates that a weak socio-economic situation is necessary, but not sufficient, for
unpopular reform. A deplorable socio-economic situation does not by itself
invoke a losses domain that triggers the pursuit of unpopular reform, but
works in conjunction with the conditions rightist government and weak politi-
cal position.
Do these two paths (WSE*WPP and WSE*RIGHT) capture the cabinets
that pursued unpopular reform? Table 3 presents the cabinets’ membership
scores of the outcome as well as of the two paths. In ten (of the 13) cabinets
that pursued unpopular measures, at least one of these two paths is present.
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Table 3. Membership scores of cases in sufficient paths
Outcome
unpopular reform
Path 1
WSE *WPP
Path 2 WSE
*RIGHT
Lubbers I 0.83 0.33 0.83
Lubbers II 0.33 0.17 0.33
Lubbers III 0.67 0.33 0.60
Kok I 0.67 0.17 0.40
Kok II 0.17 0.33 0.33
Balkenende II 0.83 0.67 0.67
Kohl I 0.33 0.17 0.33
Kohl II 0.17 0.17 0.17
Kohl III 0.33 0.17 0.33
Kohl IV 0.67 0.67 0.67
Schröder I 0.17 0.33 0.00
Schröder II 0.83 0.83 0.00
Schlüter I 0.33 0.33 0.33
Schlüter II 0.67 0.33 0.60
Schlüter IV 0.17 0.33 0.67
Schlüter V 0.33 0.60 0.67
Nyrup Rasmussen I 0.17 0.17 0.17
Nyrup Rasmussen II (& III) 0.83 0.60 0.25
Nyrup Rasmussen IV 0.67 0.33 0.25
Thatcher I 0.83 0.17 0.83
Thatcher II 0.67 0.33 0.33
Thatcher III 0.67 0.33 0.67
Major I 0.67 0.33 0.60
Blair I 0.40 0.17 0.00
Blair II 0.33 0.33 0.00
Consistency 0.91 0.90
Coverage 0.62 0.71
Notes: Cases that are ‘in’ a specific set are indicated in bold. Consistency measures the
degree to which membership in each solution term (WSE*WPP and WSE*RIGHT) is a
subset of the outcome – i.e., to what extent the solution term is sufficient for the outcome.
Coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome that is explained by each
solution term (Ragin 2006: 107–110), and therefore resembles the variance explained (R2) in
traditional quantitative approaches.
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For three cases, however, these combinations do not explain adequately the
occurrence of unpopular reform. Specifically, the cabinets Kok I, Nyrup Ras-
mussen IV andThatcher II pursued unpopular reform, but did not face aWeak
Socio-Economic Situation and had a Weak Political Position, nor did they
face a Weak Socio-Economic Situation and were Rightist Governments. This
finding indicates that although there are two clear paths towards unpopular
reform, these are not the only ones; other (combinations of) factors may also
be conducive to a domain of losses. For example, the ‘Bush-considers-the-
Iraqi-status-quo-unacceptable-because-he-was-doing-well-in-the-polls’ situa-
tion (Mercer 2005: 5) might apply to Kok I. The reasoning then would be that
because of its strong political position and the fairly strong socio-economic
situation, Kok I felt it could afford to pursue unpopular measures in order to
tackle the high level of unemployment and the high and continuously increas-
ing number of individuals receiving disability benefits (De Vries 2002).
Table 3 also reveals that two cabinets should have pursued unpopular
measures (because of their membership to WSE*RIGHT or both
WSE*RIGHT and WSE*WPP) but did not (Schlüter IV & V). This finding
suggests that there is a ‘road block’ in the paths that hinders reform from
coming about.10 In-depth case studies can help to understand better the cases
that deviate from the dominant patterns. In this sense, fs/QCA could be used
to reveal which cases to examine in more detail. This study’s results, for
example, suggest that probing Denmark more deeply would be useful as three
of the seven cases proved to be deviant ones.Although it is beyond the scope
of this article to find the ‘real’ underlying causes for the Danish exceptionality,
a plausible assumption is that this is at least partly related to the relatively
short duration of an average Danish government (two years) and to the usual
type of government (multiparty minority). The presence of multiparty minor-
ity governments means that besides the governing parties some of the oppo-
sition parties also are involved in the policy-making process. This makes it
harder, yet not impossible, to pursue reform as the less uniform the prefer-
ences regarding a certain proposed reform across groups or within groups,
the lower the likelihood of reform (Cason & Mui 2005). This may partly
explain why the cabinets Schlüter IV & V did not engage in reform.
The finding that the combination of weak socio-economic situation and a
rightist government induces governments to pursue unpopular measures sug-
gests that partisanship does matter, contrary to H3, but in a different way than
usually argued. In contrast to, for example, the findings of Allan and Scruggs
(2004), rightist governments did not pursue more or harsher unpopular mea-
sures than leftist ones. Instead, rightist governments weremore likely to pursue
unpopular reforms. Precisely, for rightist governments, a weak socio-economic
situationwas enough to trigger suchmeasures,whereas leftist governments only
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pursued unpopular reform when the socio-economic condition was poor and
their political position was weak. Furthermore, it is intriguing to note that
unpopular reforms by leftist governments are somewhat peculiar in the sense
that two of the three instances of such reform are not captured by
the dominant paths (Kok I and Nyrup Rasmussen IV). This suggests that the
conditions fostering a losses domain among leftist and rightist governments
may differ, which ties onto previous findings (e.g., Levy 1999; Ross 2000). Levy
(1999), for one, indicates that leftist and rightist governments are distinct in that
the former have used the so-called ‘vice into virtue’ approach. Specifically, in
Christian democratic welfare states, such as Italy and the Netherlands, leftist
governments have targeted vices, such as ‘inequities within the welfare system
that are simultaneously a source of either economic inefficiency or substantial
public spending’ (Levy 1999: 240).A typical example of such a vice is generous
disability pensions that are paid to large numbers of peoplewho are neither sick
nor disabled. Settling these vices allowed for freeing up resources that could
be used, for example, to facilitate (through side payments) the negotiation of
tripartite social pacts aimed at redesigning the labourmarket (a virtue).Rightist
governments, conversely, have not pursued this vice into virtue approach.
Concluding remarks
The main finding of this study is that the extent to which a government pursues
unpopular social policy reform in a given period in office is conditional on the
‘losses’ in terms of socio-economics and/or politics it faces.The fs/QCA analy-
sis of the reform activities of 25 German, Dutch, Danish and British cabinets
demonstrates that a deteriorating socio-economic situation is necessary for
unpopular reform or, more precisely, for a losses domain that triggers risk
accepting behaviour among the government and thereby induces it to pursue
unpopular measures. A falling socio-economic situation did not have this
impact by itself, but only in conjunction with one or two other conditions: a
declining political position and a rightist government.
This article’s findings enhance our understanding of the causal underpin-
nings of reform by establishing that governments pursue unpopular reform
only if they are confronted with losses. These losses, then, arise under a weak
socio-economic situation combined with a weak political position or a rightist
government (or both). Moreover, this study shows that insights from prospect
theory further existing theories of welfare state reform as they help fill impor-
tant lacunae in these theories. Notwithstanding the fact that Pierson (1994:
18–19) uses prospect theory’s key finding to explain why political actors have
such difficulty enacting unpopular measures, there has been hardly any cross-
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fertilisation of psychological theories in the field. This is particularly puzzling
since prospect theory seems particularly apt for advancing the study of welfare
state development. Let me give two examples.
First, insights from prospect theory elucidate how socio-economic variables
influence social policy reform. Socio-economic challenges affect reform indi-
rectly by (re)shaping governments’ domain and thus increasing governments’
willingness to pursue unpopular measures. Moreover, prospect theory teaches
us that it is not so much the depth of the socio-economic problem that matters
(e.g., high unemployment), but the intensification of it (e.g., rapidly rising
unemployment).
Second, prospect theory provides a theoretical footing to the question
of when ideas produce change. The hypothesis is that ideas that lead to the
adoption of unpopular measures are implemented only if governments find
themselves confronted with losses. For example, although Schröder might long
have been planning to implement his controversial agenda – as some political
commentators have argued – it was the deteriorating political position mag-
nified by the gloomy socio-economic performance that allowed the Chancellor
to actually to pursue his plans. Let me stress that the insights from prospect
theory cannot be used to predict the exact timing of reforms. Rather, the
findings from prospect theory inform us about thewhy of reform as they reveal
under which conditions political actors pursue unpopular measures. ‘Losses’
are key here, as it is precisely these that cause governments to engage in the
‘act of desperation’ by turning to reforms that may backfire electorally and
have only a (small) chance of recouping some of the incurred losses.
Prospect theory thus provides a micro-foundation that complements exist-
ing theories. It is a complement since current theories are needed to determine
in which domain political actors find themselves. Moreover, ‘prospect theory
explains which one of the available options is chosen, [but] does not account
for the range of options that a decision-maker considers’ (Weyland 2002: 70;
emphasis added). Ideational arguments can, for instance, be invoked in this
respect. Moreover, theories other than prospect theory are needed to account
for the deviant cases that may be identified. Still, the value of incorporating
insights from prospect theory demonstrated here suggests that these insights
not only advance the debate on the politics of welfare state reform, but can
also be of worth to other fields of political analysis.
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Table A1. Data used to establish the extent of unpopular reform
Data Source(s) Operationalisation
The net
unemployment
insurance (UI)
replacement ratea
Scruggs (2004) The percentage
change in the net
UI replacement
rate between
election t and
election t + 1b
The generosity
index
Scruggs (2004) See UI
replacement rate
Available (case)
studies
For Germany: Aust et al. (2002);
Leibfried & Obinger (2003);
Zohlnhöfer (2003, 2004); Schmidt
(2005); Vis (2008). For the
Netherlands: Green-Pedersen
(2002: Chapter 5); Van Gerven
(2006). For Denmark:
Green-Pedersen (2002: Chapter 5).
For the United Kingdom:
Daguerre & Taylor-Gooby
(2001/2002); Van Gerven (2006)
International
Reform Monitors
Bertelsmann Foundation
(1999–2005)d
Social Security
Worldwide dataset
ISSA (2006)e
Notes: a The net replacement rate is the after-tax benefit of a single, fully insured 40 year-old
individual earning average production worker (APW) wage divided by the after tax wage of
a fully insured APW. b Following Armingeon and Giger (2006), I only include the indicator
for the year of the election when the election took place in the second half of the year. If not,
the calculation is based on the year previous to the election under consideration. c The
generosity index is a revised version of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) decommodification index,
which taps the extent to which citizens do not depend on the market for their livelihood (see
Scruggs & Allan 2006). d http://www.reformmonitor.org. e Data available from about 1992
onwards.
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Table A2. Features of cabinets in terms of fuzzy scores, 1979–2005
Period
in office
Weak
political
position
(WPP)
Weak socio-
economic
position
(WSE)
Rightist
government
(RIGHT)
Outcome
unpopular
reform
(UR)
Netherlands
Lubbers I 09/82–05/86 0.33 0.83 1.00 0.83
Lubbers II 05/86–09/89 0.17 0.33 1.00 0.33
Lubbers III 09/89–05/94 0.33 0.67 0.60 0.67
Kok I 05/94–05/98 0.17 0.40 0.40 0.67
Kok II 05/98–05/02 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.17
Balkenende II 05/02–06/06 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.83
Germany
Kohl I 03/83–01/87 0.17 0.33 1.00 0.33
Kohl II 01/87–12/90 0.33 0.17 1.00 0.17
Kohl III 12/90–10/94 0.17 0.33 1.00 0.33
Kohl IV 10/94–09/98 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.67
Schröder I 09/98–09/02 0.33 0.40 0.00 0.17
Schröder II 09/02–11/05 0.83 0.83 0.00 0.83
Denmark
Schlüter I 09/82–10/84 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.33
Schlüter II 10/84–09/87 0.33 0.60 1.00 0.67
Schlüter IV 05/88–12/90 0.33 0.67 1.00 0.17
Schlüter V 12/90–01/93 0.60 0.67 1.00 0.33
N.Rasmussen I 01/93–09/94 0.17 0.17 0.40 0.17
N.Rasmussen II
(& III)
09/94–03/98 0.60 0.60 0.25 0.83
N.Rasmussen IV 03/98–11/01 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.67
United Kingdom
Thatcher I 05/79–06/83 0.17 0.83 1.00 0.83
Thatcher II 06/83–06/87 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.67
Thatcher III 06/87–04/92 0.33 0.67 1.00 0.67
Major I 04/92–05/97 0.33 0.60 1.00 0.67
Blair I 05/97–06/01 0.17 0.33 0.00 0.40
Blair II 06/01–05/05 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.33
Notes: Cases that are ‘in’ a specific set are indicated in bold; N.Rasmussen = Nyrup
Rasmussen.
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Notes
1. The terms ‘government’ and ‘cabinet’ are used interchangeably.
2. ‘Risk’ is the probability that an event occurs (e.g., loss of votes in an election) multiplied
by the impact if it did (e.g., loss of power, removal from government).Governments thus
could get away with unpopular reform (e.g., if social policy is not a salient issue in the
election campaign), but they could also suffer (major) losses because of it. Since this
article deals with the conditions under which governments are willing to bite the bullet
of risky reform, and not with the effects of reform on, for example, the percentage of
votes, the question of whether reform actually results in electoral losses is an irrelevant
one.
3. For reasons of simplicity and clarity, I employ prospect theory’s central finding only. For
interesting extensions in prospect theory, see Kahneman and Tversky (2000).
4. This article follows Schneider andWagemann (2006: 777, fn.3) in adopting the acronym
‘fs/QCA’, since the dichotomies that are central to the traditional QCA approach are a
special case of a fuzzy-set.
5. The analysis includes theGerman cabinets from Kohl I to Schröder II (N = 6); theDutch
cabinets from Lubbers I to Balkenende II (excluding Balkenende I because this cabinet
reigned less than a year) (N = 6); theDanish cabinets from Schlüter I to Nyrup Rasmus-
sen IV (excluding Schlüter III because this cabinet governed less than a year; and
incorporating Nyrup Ramussen III in Nyrup Rasmussen II because the former resulted
from the Centre Democrats leaving the coalition) (N = 7); and the British cabinets from
Thatcher I to Blair II (N = 6).
6. The exceptions are Kok I, Thatcher II and Nyrup Rasmussen IV.
7. The full dataset is available upon request from the author.
8. Note that both cabinets including Christian democrats (such as Kohl I–IV) as well
as secular-conservatives cabinets (such as Thatcher I–III) are coded as rightist.
Given the emphasis of leftist and rightist issues in the manifesto programmes of the
parties in government, this coding makes sense. For calculating the policy orientation
of the government, the left–right scale constructed by the Comparative Manifesto
Project is particularly useful (see Budge et al. 2001). This left–right scale taps the
policy orientation of a party by means of the percentage of references to rightist
issues (e.g., freedom and economic incentives) and leftist issues (e.g., democracy and
labour groups) (for all categories, see Budge et al. 2001: Table 1.1). The scale ranges
from -100 (when the entire programme is devoted to leftist issues) to +100 (when the
entire programme is devoted to rightist issues). The policy orientation of the govern-
ment can be calculated as follows: [S(absolute number of seats of partyi in
government ¥ partyi’s left–right score)]/(total number of seats for the cabinet). To illus-
trate the coding using the Kohl I cabinet as an example, the number of seats of the
parties in government (FDP and CDU/CSU) was 34 and 244. These parties’ left–right
scores were 4.0 and 29.93. The left–right score for the cabinet is thus:
[(34 ¥ 4) + (244 ¥ 29.93)]/278 = 26.76. According to this left–right score per cabinet,
the secular-conservative Thatcher governments and the German and Dutch cabinets
including the Christian democrats (i.e., Kohl and Lubbers) are not that far apart ideo-
logically. For example, the Thatcher II cabinet and Lubbers I hardly differ, with both
scoring well in the rightist part of the scale (29.0 versus 28.33). Moreover, the Kohl
cabinets are overwhelmingly rightist, with Kohl I even scoring higher than Thatcher I
(26.76 versus 24.4).
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9. The most parsimonious solution (i.e., with setting the remainders to ‘don’t care’) is
WSE → UR (coverage: 0.88; consistency: 0.90). With simplifying assumptions, WSE is
thus necessary and sufficient for Unpopular Reform.
10. Thanks to Richard Katz for pointing this out to me.
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